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Congress has provided that employees have a right to a jury
trial when they sue their employers for discrimination on the basis
of a protected status.1 In 1991, shortly before Congress permitted
victims of discrimination the right to sue for damages, the
Supreme Court held that an employer and an employee may agree
by contract to waive an employee's statutory right to a jury trial.2
The Court's willingness to uphold so-called compulsory arbitration
clauses was based in large part on the parties' freedom to
contract;3 the Court has noted that because the parties bargained
for arbitration in their contract, they should be held to their
bargain. 4
Recently, in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps,5
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expanded the scope of
the Supreme Court's decision by allowing an employer to condition
an offer of employment on signing a contract that would waive the
employee's statutory right to a jury trial.6 In such cases, if the
prospective employee refuses to sign the contract waiving his or
her statutory rights, the employer withdraws the offer of
employment. Forced arbitration clauses differ from compulsory
arbitration clauses in one significant respect: with compulsory
arbitration clauses, the employee actually signs the agreement to
' Mara Kent is an Assistant Professor of Contract Law at Thomas M. Cooley Law
School in Lansing, Michigan. She is a 1993 graduate of the University of Michigan
and a 1996 summa cum laude graduate of the University of Detroit Mercy School of
Law, where she graduated second in her class. Before becoming a professor, Ms.
Kent was an appellate attorney practicing civil rights and employment law. Ms.
Kent also serves as a coordinating attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union
in Detroit, Michigan.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (2000).
2. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
3. See id. at 24-25.
4. Id. at 26.
5. 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
6. See id. at 749, 754.
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arbitrate, and thus is "compelled" to live up to the bargain,
whereas with forced arbitration clauses, the employee who objects
to the agreement is forced to choose between signing it or losing
his or her job. Forced arbitration clauses are one of the most hotly
contested issues in the civil rights and employment law context
today. This is evidenced by the numerous amici curiae who
submitted briefs at the appellate court level before the Ninth
Circuit, including the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP), the National Employment Lawyers Association, the
Employers Group, numerous individual members of the United
States House of Representatives, and the Equal Employment
Advisory Council. 7
This Article will discuss whether the court in Luce Forward
properly considered what Congress intended when it provided for
the statutory right to a jury trial for civil rights claims and
whether civil rights statutes should be interpreted to require a
voluntary waiver of this right to a jury trial. First, this Article
will explore the legislative history of the civil rights statutes
providing for the right to a jury trial and permissive arbitration of
statutory civil rights claims.8 Second, it will survey the Supreme
Court's recent history regarding arbitration of civil rights claims. 9
Third, the Article will explore the Ninth Circuit's expansion of the
Supreme Court's arbitration and civil rights decisions in Luce
Forward and it will discuss why the majority in that case was
misguided.10 Finally, it will offer opportunities for the Supreme
Court to clarify the intent of the civil rights statutes as they relate
to waiving the right to a jury trial by proposing a balancing
approach that is fair to both the employer and the employee and is
consistent with the text and legislative history of the civil rights
statutes."
7. Id. at 743. Forced arbitration clauses are contested in the consumer lending
context as well. For example, AARP, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and a
number of other groups have recently praised the lending institution Freddie Mac,
which publicly announced that starting in August 2004, it will refuse to buy
subprime mortgage loans with forced arbitration clauses contained in them.
Freddie Mac Will Not Buy Subprime Loans that Contain Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses, 72 U.S.L.W. 2342 (BNA) (Dec. 16, 2003).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
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I. The Statutory Right to a Jury Trial for Civil Rights
Violations
An employer is prohibited from discriminating against an
employee or applicant for employment because of that person's
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 12 disability,13 or age. 14
Before 1991, section 706(g) of Title VII permitted courts to award
monetary damages only where the employee was a victim of
intentional race discrimination. 15  In response to then-recent
Supreme Court cases, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991 (the 1991 Act) in order to more effectively deter
discrimination and compensate its victims. 16  The 1991 Act
amended Title VII and allowed for compensatory and punitive
damages for all protected classes, including actions based on
gender and religious discrimination, as well as claims based on
race discrimination. 17 Providing monetary damages was seen as
" necessary to conform remedies for intentional gender and
religious discrimination to those currently available to victims of
intentional race discrimination."18
The Act and legislative history make clear that the damage
provision, however, was not meant to foreclose other avenues of
dispute resolution. One of the committee reports for the 1991 Act
specifically notes that the provision entitling victims of
discrimination to monetary damages and potential jury awards
would not "undermine Title VII's policy encouraging the
conciliation and settlement of claims of discrimination."' 9 The
1991 Act also added a provision regarding alternative means of
12.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
13. Id. § 12112(a).
14.29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
15. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I) at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
603.
16. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11) at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N. 694, 694.
17. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I) at 64-65, 74, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 602-
03, 612. The 1991 Act amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adding the
following provision:
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an
employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)
prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. 2000e-2,
2000e-3, 2000e-16], ... the complaining party may recover compensatory
and punitive damages ... in addition to any relief authorized by section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).
18. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I) at 64, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 602.
19. Id. at 65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 603.
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dispute resolution: 'Where appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or
provisions of Federal law amended by this title."20
The 1991 Act's legislative history supports the position that
the arbitration provisions were intended to be strictly voluntary.
Before its enactment, the Committee on Education and Labor
rejected an amendment that would have precluded jury trials.21
The legislative history shows why the proposed amendment was
not adopted:
[The 1991 Act] includes a provision encouraging the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution to supplement, rather
than supplant, the rights and remedies provided by Title VII.
The [proposed] substitute [legislation], however, encourages
the use of such mechanisms "in place of judicial resolution."
Thus, under the latter proposal employers could refuse to hire
workers unless they signed a binding statement waiving all
rights to file Title VII-complaints. Such a rule would fly in the
face of Supreme Court decisions holding that workers have the
right to go to court, rather than being forced into compulsory
arbitration, to resolve important statutory and constitutional
rights, including employment opportunity rights. American
workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs and
their civil rights.22
The Committee Report emphasized that alternative means of
dispute resolution were intended to "encourage" settlement
negotiations, arbitration, facilitation, and mediation. 23 Further,
the Committee Report stated that the 1991 Act "emphasizes ...
that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is
intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by
Title VII."24 Despite the presence of this language favoring
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Alternate Means of Dispute Resolution).
21. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I) at 97-98, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 635-36.
The amendment provided: "In no case arising under this title shall a jury consider,
recommend, or determine the amount of any monetary award sought pursuant to
[this section]." Id. at 102-03, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 640-41. The
Committee on Labor and Education was chaired by Representative William D.
Ford of Michigan. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, History of the
Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Members Who Have Served as
Chairman, at http://edworkforce.house.gov/committee/history.htm (last visited Oct.
29, 2004).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40() at 104, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 642
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 97, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 635.
24. Id.
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arbitration, the Committee concluded that "any agreement to
submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a
collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract,
does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the
enforcement provisions of Title VII."25 It further noted that it did
"not intend [the 1991 Act] to be used to preclude rights and
remedies that would otherwise be available." 26
President George H. Bush stated that the 1991 Act would
"ensur[el that aggrieved parties have effective remedies." 27 After
noting the 1991 Act's "major provisions" were the subject of
bipartisan consensus, the President stated that the 1991 Act
expanded "the statutory prohibition against racial discrimination
in connection with employment contracts; and the creation of
meaningful monetary remedies for all forms of workplace
harassment outlawed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."2s The President continued:
Another important source of the controversy that delayed
enactment of this legislation was a proposal to authorize jury
trials and punitive damages in cases arising under Title VII.
[The 1991 Act] adopts a compromise under which "caps" have
been placed on the amount that juries may award in such
cases. The adoption of these limits on jury awards sets an
important precedent ....
In addition to the protections provided by the "caps," [the
1991 Act] encourages voluntary agreements between
employers and employees to rely on alternative mechanisms
such as mediation and arbitration. This provision is among
the most valuable in the Act because of the important
contribution that voluntary private arrangements can make in
the effort to conserve the scarce resources of the Federal
judiciary for those matters as to which no alternative forum
would be possible or appropriate. 29
With this backdrop, the Supreme Court has had occasion to
interpret both the original Civil Rights Act and the 1991 Act to
determine whether employers can require their employees to




27. Statement of President George Bush upon Signing S. 1745 (Nov. 21, 1991), in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768 (Nov. 25, 1991).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
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II. The Recent History of the Supreme Court's Decisions
Regarding Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims
A. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Several months before Congress enacted the 1991 Act, the
Supreme Court held, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,30 that an employee's age-discrimination claim was subject
to compulsory arbitration because the employee signed an
arbitration agreement.31 The employee, Robert Gilmer, registered
with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as a securities
representative, as was required by his employment. 32  The
registration application that Gilmer signed provided in part that
he agreed to arbitrate disputes with his employer as required by
NYSE rules. 33 The NYSE rules provided that an employee must
arbitrate "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative
and any member or member organization arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative."'34 Gilmer's employer terminated his employment
in 1987, when Gilmer was 62 years old.35 Gilmer eventually
brought suit, alleging that he was discharged because of his age in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA).36
In response to Gilmer's complaint, his employer filed a
motion in district court to compel Gilmer to arbitrate his ADEA
claim against his employer..37  The district court denied the
employer's motion, concluding that "Congress intended to protect
ADEA claimants from the waiver of a judicial forum."3 The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision, stating "nothing in the text, legislative history, or
underlying purposes of the ADEA indicat[es] a congressional
intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements."'39 To
30. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id. (alteration in original).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 24.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th
Cir. 1990)).
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resolve the issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.40
The Court began its analysis by discussing the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).41 The purpose of the FAA "was to reverse
the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that
had existed at English common law and had been adopted by
American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the
same footing as other contracts." 42 The substantive provision of
the FAA in question states: "A written provision in ... a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."43 The Gilmer Court reiterated a significant earlier
teaching as to which rights are affected by the FAA: "[B]y agreeing
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."44
Most importantly, the Court stated:
Although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for
arbitration, "[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue." In this regard, we note that the
burden is on Gilmer to show that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims. If such
an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the
ADEA, its legislative history, or an "inherent conflict" between
arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes. Throughout
such an inquiry, it should be kept in mind that "questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration. '45
Gilmer conceded to the Court that, at the time, neither the
ADEA's text nor its legislative history "explicitly preclude[d]
arbitration."46  He argued, however, that requiring arbitration
went against the purpose of the ADEA because it deprived
40. Id.
41. The Court noted the FAA reflects a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements." Id. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
42. Id.
43. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
44. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
45. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
46. Id.
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individuals of a judicial forum. 4 7 The Court rejected Gilmer's
contention, noting that Congress did not specifically preclude
arbitration, "even in its recent amendments to the ADEA. '[I]f
Congress intended the substantive protection afforded [by the
ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a
judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or
legislative history.' 45
Gilmer also argued that the ADEA was designed to further
important social policies in addition to addressing individual
grievances. 49 The Court disagreed, stating that there was no
"inherent inconsistency between those policies.., and enforcing
agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims."50 It noted that
both judicial resolution of claims and alternative means of dispute
resolution, like arbitration, can further broad social purposes. 51
The Court opined that "[slo long as the [employee] may vindicate
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the
[ADEA] will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function." 52
As one of many objections to the arbitration process, Gilmer
argued that there is often unequal bargaining power between
employers and employees.5 3 The Court noted, however, "[m]ere
inequality in bargaining power... is not a sufficient reason to
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the
employment context."54 It stated that courts should be aware of
supported claims that the arbitration agreement was the result of
fraud or coercion but that such disputes about unequal bargaining
power should be resolved on a case-by-case basis.55 The Court
ultimately required Gilmer to arbitrate his ADEA claim pursuant
to the securities agreement he signed.5 6
B. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
In 2001, the Supreme Court was again faced with the
47. Id. at 29.
48. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 27-28.
52. Id. at 28 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
53. Id. at 33.
54. Id.
55. Id. It noted that "[tihere is no indication in this case, however, that Gilmer,
an experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the
arbitration clause in his registration application." Id.
56. See id. at 24-25, 35.
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question of whether employers can compel employees to arbitrate
their claims if the employee signed an arbitration agreement.
Specifically, the Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
57
addressed the issue of whether the FAA exempted employees from
having to arbitrate their claims in all employment contracts or
only those employment contracts of transportation workers. 58 The
Court held that the FAA exempts from its coverage transportation
workers only, and all other employment claims may properly be
the subject of the FAA.59
In 1995, Adams applied for a job at a Circuit City store, at
which time he signed an employment application that stated in
relevant part:
I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted
claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to
my application or candidacy for employment, and/or cessation
of employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final and
binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. By way of
example only, such claims include claims under federal, state,
and local statutory or common law, such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the law or contract and [the] law of tort.60
Two years after signing the arbitration agreement, Adams
filed suit in state court against Circuit City alleging violations of
California's employment act.6 1 Circuit City filed suit in federal
court, requesting the court to enjoin the state court action and to
compel arbitration of Adams's claims. 62 The district court enjoined
the state court action, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, claiming that all employment contracts are
excluded from the FAA.63 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 64
Adams argued that his employment contract was not a
"contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce"
as stated by the FAA; therefore, the FAA did not apply to him.65
Citing Gilmer, the Court rejected Adams's claim, stating that
Adams's proposed interpretation of the FAA would be inconsistent
57. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 109-10 (alteration in original).
61. Id. at 110.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 110-11.
64. Id. at 111.
65. Id. at 113.
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with Gilmer and could not be reconciled with the Court's
"expansive reading" of the words contained in the FAA.66
Adams also argued that the Court should interpret the
meaning of "engaged in commerce" differently for employment
contracts "because the FAA was enacted when congressional
authority to regulate under the commerce power was to a large
extent confined by [previously decided Supreme Court]
decisions." 67  But the Court rejected the argument, noting:
"Construing the [FAA] to exclude all employment contracts fails to
give independent effect to the statute's enumeration of the specific
categories of workers which precedes it."68
The Court stated that its decision was reached based on the
text of the FAA; therefore, it did not need to address the legislative
history of the exclusion provision.69 Based on a reading of the text
alone, the Court held that the FAA exempts from its coverage
transportation workers only, and all other employment claims
may properly be the subject of the FAA. 70 Finally, the Court noted
its decision was consistent with previous Supreme Court case law
"holding that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the
FAA without contravening the policies of congressional
enactments giving employees specific protection against
discrimination prohibited by federal law."71 Although the Court
recognized that Gilmer involved the federal ADEA and Circuit
City involved a state statute, it made no difference to the Court's
decision that the employee was required to pursue arbitration
because he signed an employment contract requiring arbitration. 72
C. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
In 2002, the Supreme Court again was faced with a case
concerning a compulsory arbitration clause contained in an
employment contract. In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,73 the Court
decided that a contract between an employee and employer
containing a compulsory arbitration clause did not preclude the
66. Id. at 113-14. The Court refers to its decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), as adopting an "expansive reading" of § 2 of the
FAA. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113.
67. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 116.
68. Id. at 114.
69. Id. at 119.
70. Id. at 109, 119.
71. Id. at 123.
72. Id. at 123-24.
73. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from
pursuing employee-specific relief, including damages. 74
In the Waffle House case, the employee, Baker, was required,
as a condition of employment, to sign an application that
contained a mandatory arbitration clause. 75 After working at
Waffle House for a brief period, Baker had a seizure while at work
and was subsequently fired.76 Baker filed a claim with the EEOC
alleging that he was fired in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 77
The EEOC investigated the claim, and after first attempting
to conciliate with Waffle House, it filed an enforcement action in
federal district court.78 The complaint sought both injunctive
relief as well as any other specific relief as would make Baker
whole, including damages. 79 Waffle House then filed a petition
under the FAA to stay the proceedings in federal court and to
compel arbitration. 80 The district court denied Waffle House's
motion based on the determination that the employment contract
itself did not contain the arbitration clause.8 ' The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal
and ruled that the EEOC's remedies were limited to injunctive
relief.8 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the circuits over whether the EEOC may pursue an
enforcement action in court despite an employee-signed
arbitration agreement. 83
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the
EEOC was initially limited to an investigatory-at most,
conciliatory-role, but that the 1972 amendments to Title VII
"created a system in which the EEOC was intended 'to bear the
primary burden of litigation."'84 The Court further noted that
later amendments allowed recovery of damages by a "complaining
party," a term which includes both the EEOC and individual
74. Id. at 282-85.
75. Id. at 282-83.
76. Id. at 283.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 283-84.
80. Id. at 284.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 284-85.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 286 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326
(1980)).
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litigants.85 The Court decided that because the EEOC may be a
complaining party, it was permitted to bring suit to enjoin an
employer from discriminating against an employee in violation of
the statute, and to "pursue reinstatement, backpay, and
compensatory or punitive damages."8 6 The Court stated:
The FAA directs courts to place arbitration agreements on
equal footing with other contracts, but it "does not require
parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so."
Because the FAA is "at bottom a policy guaranteeing the
enforcement of private contractual arrangements," we look
first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not
to general policy goals, to determine the scope of the
agreement.8 7
The Court further stated that where there are ambiguities in
the language of the contract, it should be interpreted in favor of
arbitration.88 However, the Court noted that it cannot reach a
result that is inconsistent with the unambiguous language of the
contract merely because there is a policy favoring arbitration.8 9
In perhaps one of its most important statements on the issue
at hand, the Court stated, "[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a
matter of consent, not coercion." 90  The Court cited a previous
decision in which it stated that "the FAA does not confer a right to
compel arbitration of any dispute at any time; it confers only the
right to obtain an order directing that 'arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in [the parties'] agreement.' 9 1
In concluding that the contract was unambiguous, the Court
stated that a contract cannot bind an entity who is not a party to
the contract. 92 Since the EEOC was not a party to the contract
between Adams and Waffle House, it was not bound by the
arbitration clause. 93 The Court ultimately rejected Waffle House's
arguments and noted that the Fourth Circuit had "turn[ed] what
is effectively a forum selection clause into a waiver of a nonparty's
85. Id. at 287 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(1)(A), (a)(1) (1994)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 293-94 (citations omitted) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
88. Id. at 294.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479) (alteration in original).
91. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 293, n.9 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-75)
(alteration in original).
92. Id. at 294.
93. Id.
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statutory remedies." 94 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
EEOC was entitled to pursue an action against Waffle House,
including seeking compensatory or punitive damages, since it was
not a party to the arbitration agreement between the employee
and Waffle House. 95
III. The Ninth Circuit's Decision in EEOC v. Luce, Forward,
Hamilton & Scripps
A. The Decision
In September 2003, in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps,96 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
employer does not have to hire an applicant when that applicant
refuses to sign a mandatory arbitration clause. 97
Donald Lagatree applied for a job as a legal secretary at the
law firm of Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP, and the law
firm presented him with an offer letter on his first day of work. 98
The letter included a mandatory arbitration provision.99 The
letter provided:
In the event of any dispute or claim between you and the
firm (including employees, partners, agents, successors and
assigns), including but not limited to claims arising from or
related to your employment or the termination of your
employment, we jointly agree to submit all such disputes or
claims to confidential binding arbitration, under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Any arbitration must be initiated within 180
days after the dispute or claim first arose, and will be heard
before a retired State or Federal judge in the county
containing the firm office in which you were last employed.
The law of the State in which you last worked will apply.1° °
Lagatree protested the requirement that he sign the
arbitration agreement, stating that the arbitration agreement
"was unfair."'01 The firm told Lagatree that the agreement was a
non-negotiable condition of employment and, after Lagatree again
94. Id. at 295.
95. Id. at 298.
96. 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
97. Id. at 749.
98. Id. at 743.
99. Id. at 745.
100. Id.
101. Id. Lagatree testified in his deposition "that he believed he needed to retain
his 'civil liberties, including the right to a jury trial and redress of grievances
through the government process."' Id.
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refused to sign the agreement, withdrew its job offer. 10 2 This
refusal was the only reason he was not hired. 10 3
Lagatree filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC and
the EEOC sued Luce Forward in federal court on Lagatree's
behalf.104  The district court's opinion found that the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.105
prohibited the law firm from requiring employees to sign
compulsory arbitration agreements. 0 6 The lower court enjoined
the firm from requiring, requesting, or enforcing such provisions
with regard to Title VII claims. 0 7 Luce Forward appealed'0 8 and
the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the case. 0 9
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by citing the provisions
of Title VII and of the 1991 Act, which "for the first time [provided]
a right to damages and to trial by jury."" 0 It also cited Gilmer,
noting that it was decided six months before the enactment of the
1991 Act.111 The court noted that Gilmer stood for the principle
that "statutory claims can be made subject to arbitration, 'unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies." '112 It found the Supreme Court's favorable
language regarding arbitration to undercut the claim in Duffield
that compulsory arbitration agreements are inconsistent with the
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 745-46. Lagatree also unsuccessfully sued the law firm in state court,
alleging that he was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy and of the
California Unfair Competition law. Id. at 745.
105. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duffield, the court held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 prohibited employers from conditioning employment on the
mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims. Id. at 1185.
106. Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 745.
107. Id. at 745-46.
108. Id. The EEOC also cross-appealed, "seeking to enjoin Luce Forward from
engaging in an 'unlawful retaliatory practice by denying employment to any
applicant... who refuses to waive his right to participate in statutorily
protected... proceedings."' Id. at 746.
109. Id. A three judge panel of the 9th Circuit initially heard the appeal,
reaching a similar result as the en banc rehearing, but by different reasoning. See
id. at 744. The panel opinion was later withdrawn. Id. at 744-45. For discussion
of the first Ninth Circuit opinion, see Nicole Karas, EEOC v. Luce and the
Mandatory Arbitration Agreement, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 67 (2003) and Steven S.
Poindexter, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Title VII:
Promoting Efficiency While Protecting Employee Rights, 2003 J. DIsP. RESOL. 301.
110. Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 746-47.
111. Id. at 747
112. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985))).
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purposes of the 1991 Act. 113 The court also refused to examine the
legislative history of the Act, finding that the text of the Act
clearly did not preclude such agreements."14
The court noted its Duffield decision "stands alone" against
the other federal circuit courts that had concluded Title VII does
not prohibit mandatory arbitration agreements." 5 Indeed, the
court cited cases from ten other circuits allegedly supporting its
position.1 6 The Ninth Circuit thus overturned its decision in
Duffield, which held that "for Title VII claims, the 1991 Act
precludes enforcement of arbitration agreements entered into as a
condition of employment." 1 7 Two members of the Luce Forward
panel issued opinions criticizing the majority's approach and
result.118
B. Criticism of the Decision
1. The Court's Reasoning Was Flawed Because the Court
Relied on Unsupportive or Distinguishable Case Law
The Ninth Circuit's reading of precedent was flawed. First,
the court improperly cited Gilmer, a case that predated the 1991
Act, as support for its position that allowing compulsory
arbitration does not weaken the 1991 Act.119 Second, the court
also cited the Waffle House decision as continued support for
mandatory arbitration clauses, without recognizing that Waffle
113. See id. at 749-51.
114. Id. at 751-52.
115. Id. at 748.
116. Id. (citing Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206
(2d Cir. 1999); Koveleskie v. SBC Capitol Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir.
1999); Rosenberg v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 21 (1st
Cir. 1999); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997);
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Class Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 881-82 (4th Cir.
1996); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487
(10th Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir.
1996); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1991);
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); Seus v.
John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1988)). *
117. Id. at 749 (citing Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185
(9th Cir. 1998)).
118. Both opinions argued that the court's earlier analysis in Duffield followed
much more closely Supreme Court teaching and congressional intent than did the
majority opinion's. See id. at 754-61 (Pregerson, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); id. at 762-68 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Judge Reinhardt's
dissent also characterized the majority as manifesting a historical judicial tendency
to undercut legislation benefiting workers, women, and people of color. See id. at
762, 768.
119. Id. at 750 (majority opinion).
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House and Gilmer differed significantly from the facts in Luce
Forward. The Supreme Court cases dealt with employees who
signed arbitration agreements but who later wanted to invalidate
their contracts or permit the EEOC to pursue a damages claim
despite the employee-signed contract; Luce Forward dealt with an
employee who refused to sign the contract in the first place.
Therefore, the principles of contract law on which Gilmer and
Waffle House were based do not apply to Luce Forward because
the contract was never signed.
The Luce Forward court also "reject[ed] the argument...
that the 1991 Act's provision of a right to jury trial precludes
arbitration of Title VII claims."'120 Using somewhat perplexing
language in support of its position, the court recognized that even
Duffield "acknowledged that right provides no general bar to
voluntary arbitration."'12 1 Although it later noted the distinction
between voluntary and compulsory arbitration, it stated that it
would "now join several other circuits in concluding, pursuant to
Gilmer, that the right to jury trial presents no bar to compulsory
arbitration."122 However, the court clearly missed the significance
that Gilmer was decided before the 1991 Act. Careful examination
reveals that only one case on which the Ninth Circuit relied
addresses the issue of whether an employee can condition an
employment offer on signing a waiver. That Second Circuit
opinion, Desiderio v. National Ass'n of Security Dealers, Inc.,123
also found the text of the 1991 Act, specifically the Act's language
encouraging alternative dispute resolution,124 to be unambiguous
and did not look to the legislative history.' 25
In each of the other nine decisions the Ninth Circuit cited,
the federal circuit courts dealt with post-contractual claims-
employees who wanted to get out of the contracts they already
signed. 126 Only the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit have now
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. See cases cited supra note 116.
123. 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999).
124. See supra text accompanying note 20.
125. Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 204-06.
126. The First Circuit case dealt with an employee who "signed a standard
securities industry form . . . agreeing to arbitrate certain claims after being hired
by Merrill." Rosenberg v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit case dealt with an employee who "was required
to sign a Form U-4 ... contain[ing an] arbitration clause." Seus v. John Nuveen &
Co., 146 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1988). The Fourth Circuit case involved an
employee who worked for her employer for approximately 14 years under a
collective bargaining agreement that contained a compulsory arbitration clause.
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extended a reading of the statute to hold that an employer may
condition an offer of employment on waiving a statutory right,
even though the text of the statute is silent on the issue and the
legislative history is clearly against allowing employers to do so.
2. The Court Failed to Recognize Alternative Readings of
the Text of the 1991 Act
Although the court examined the text of the 1991 Act, it did
not appreciate its significance as it relates to an employee who
refuses to contractually waive a statutory right. The court noted
that the text of the 1991 Act encourages alternative dispute
resolution 127 but it failed to recognize the importance of the word
"encouraged" in the 1991 Act. The court stated, "[a]lthough the
Gilmer Court did not expressly interpret the ADEA's text because
Gilmer conceded that nothing in the text precluded arbitration...
it squarely held that claims under the ADEA can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration."' 128 However, recognizing that "nothing in
the text precludes arbitration" and recognizing that "nothing in
the text requires arbitration" are two completely different legal
points. Even though claims under the civil rights statutes can be
subject to compulsory arbitration, the text of the statute does not
permit an employer to condition employment on signing an
agreement. The text of the 1991 Act simply states that arbitration
"is encouraged." Luce Forward stands for the proposition that
arbitration is encouraged, even absent an agreement to arbitrate.
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Class Container, Inc. 78 F.3d 875, 877-78 (4th Cir.
1996). The Fifth Circuit case involved an employee who was fired from her job as a
stockbroker after she signed a contract containing an arbitration clause. Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 229 (5th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit
case considered a securities registration form apparently signed before employment
began, but did not find the form to be an employment contract. Willis v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit
decision the Luce Forward court cited involved an employee who "signed [a] Form
U-4 ... requir[ing], among other things, that a securities trader arbitrate ... any
dispute with his or her employer." Koveleskie v. SBC Capitol Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d
361, 363 (7th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit decision involved an employee who
"signed an arbitration clause set forth on the last page of [an employee] handbook."
Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1997). The Tenth
Circuit decision involved an employee who signed a registration form for a security
dealer's association which required her to arbitrate all claims between her and her
employer. Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1486
(10th Cir. 1994). Finally, the court cited an Eleventh Circuit decision involving an
employee who, "[iun her application for registration as a stock broker[,] ... agreed
to arbitrate disputes with her employer." Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1996).
127. See supra text accompanying note 20.
128. Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 751 (emphasis added).
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The Luce Forward court also stated, "[t]he phrase 'where
appropriate' simply provides no direct indication that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of the judicial forum."'1 29 While the
court's statement is true, it is equally true that the text of the
1991 Act does not address whether an employer can force an
employee to sign a waiver or withdraw the offer of employment.
130
A more plausible interpretation, one consistent with the legislative
history of the 1991 Act, is that Congress intended to allow
voluntary waiver of employees' rights, but not forced waiver.
13
'
Absent from the court's analysis in Luce Forward is any discussion
of the distinction between voluntarily waiving statutory rights and
being forced to choose between waiving those rights and gaining
meaningful employment all together.
3. The Court Should Have Relied on the Legislative History
of the 1991 Act
The Ninth Circuit also chose not rely on the legislative
history of the 1991 Act. The court stated that it found the text of
the Act to be unambiguous; therefore, it would not consider the
Act's legislative history, despite recognizing "[t]he legislative
history does contain language suggesting Congress intended to
retain the judicial forum."1 32 Quoting Desiderio with approval, the
Ninth Circuit noted that "primarily because we find the language
of the statute to be clear, we need not consider the inconsistent
legislative history."' 33 It is true, as the court noted, the text is
clear that it does not "preclude" a waiver, but again, the court
missed the point. While waiver is not precluded, waiver is also not
required. The text of the 1991 Act is silent as to whether an
employer may condition the offer of employment on signing the
waiver.
Where the text of an act is silent, looking at the legislative
history is appropriate. 34  There can be no doubt that the
129. See id.
130. Cf. id. at 758 (Pregerson, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("It is
true the text of § 118 does not contain 'prohibitory language.' But the text does
contain limiting phrases such as 'where appropriate' and 'to the extent authorized
by law."').
131. See id. at 758 n. 4; see also id. at 767 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe
majority in Congress who voted for the 1991 Civil Rights Act plainly thought that
the Act did not allow employers to force their workers to sign compulsory
arbitration clauses forfeiting their right to trial by jury in Title VII cases.").
132. Id. at 752-53 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 753 (quoting Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 205-06).
134. Judge Pregerson's opinion argues that the majority wrongly interprets the
issue as one of general statutory construction. Id. at 759 (Pregerson, J. dissenting
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legislative history of the 1991 Act is inconsistent with Luce
Forward, and indeed, the Ninth Circuit recognized the
inconsistency. The flaw in the Ninth Circuit's analysis was that it
claimed it was prevented from examining legislative history
because the text of the statute does not "preclude" waiver.
However, the issue was not whether waiver was precluded in
general, but whether, in the absence of a voluntary waiver, an
employer may refuse to hire an employee because the employee
did not relinquish the right to a jury trial afforded by statute.
After all, Waffle House recognized "arbitration is a matter of
consent, not coercion."'135
IV. Reconciling Basic Contract Principles with Statutory
Civil Rights Protections to Achieve a Consistent
Reading of the 1991 Act and Its Legislative History
According to basic contract principles, once a contract is
signed, it is binding on both parties, unless a doctrine applies that
would void the contract. 136 In the past, once an employee has
signed a contract, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to find
fraud, duress, or unconscionability in the mere inequality of
bargaining power between the employer and the employee. 137
Gilmer recognized that courts should be aware of supported claims
that the arbitration agreement was the result of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that "would provide grounds for the
revocation of any contract"1 38 but refused to, as a rule, preclude
such agreements. 39 The Court in Gilmer specifically stated
"[hiaving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held
to it."140
The Court's analysis in Gilmer should not be the same
in part and concurring in part). He notes Gilmer established the inquiry regarding
congressional intent to include both a statute's text and its legislative history as
alternative sources of authority. Id. A court need not reach any conclusion when
examining the text before the court looks to the legislative history.
135. See supra text accompanying note 90.
136. Courts would traditionally void contracts in limited circumstances, such as
if a contracting party lacked capacity or entered a contract because of
misrepresentation or duress. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 4.1 (3d ed. 2004).
137. See supra text accompanying note 54.
138. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
139. See supra text accompanying note 55.
140. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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analysis that is applied to pre-contract disputes. The employee in
Luce Forward never made the decision to arbitrate. Similarly, in
the Waffle House case, the EEOC never made the decision to
arbitrate. The Court in Waffle House limited the scope of the FAA
to compelling arbitration according to parties' agreements.' 4'
Because the EEOC never made the decision to arbitrate, the Court
could not compel it to arbitrate the claim it pursued on the
employee's behalf, even though the 1991 Act "encourages"
arbitration.142
It would be against the purpose of the 1991 Act, as evidenced
by its legislative history, to allow employers to circumvent the
protections of the statute by forcing employees to give up their
rights. It is one thing if an employee signs an agreement; it is
very difficult to void a contract that was legally entered into,
absent extraordinary circumstances. But it is quite another thing
to allow employers to force employees to choose between their civil
rights and being employed. As the legislative history suggests,
"[s]uch a rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court decisions
holding that workers have the right to go to court, rather than
being forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve important
statutory and constitutional rights, including employment
opportunity rights.... 14 3
While a general rule of classical contract law is that parties
are free to contract with anyone they wish, one legal tenet that
predates the classical contract law model "has long placed
limitations on the right of certain parties to choose the persons
with whom they contract."'144 Modern courts have been more
willing to "prohibit discrimination prior to bargain contract
formation in circumstances deemed appropriate in the light of
social values prevailing at a given time."'14 5 So too should courts
prohibit employers from forcing employees to forfeit their anti-
discrimination protections in order to receive a job. Where a
statute's legislative history clearly provides a right to a jury trial
and damages in the event of discrimination, courts should be loath
to allow employers to avoid the employee-provided protections of
the statute by forcing employees to sign arbitration contracts with
141. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
142. See supra text accompanying note 87.
143. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1) at 104 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549
at 642.
144. Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A
Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting
Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 202 (1994).
145. Id. at 203.
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which they do not agree.
Employers are not at a loss under either the text or the
legislative history of the 1991 Act. Employers can legitimately
seek to avoid the costs associated with litigation where the
employee agrees to a knowing and voluntary waiver of his or her
statutory rights. Therefore, the parties may choose to bargain
away their statutory right to a jury trial where the employer has
disclosed the nature of the employee's statutory right and has not
forced the employee to sign the agreement or lose the job. Such an
approach is consistent with both the text and the legislative
history of the statute, as well as with Supreme Court decisions. A
balanced approach between employer and employee rights was
achieved by the 1991 Act and courts should enforce this balance.
Conclusion
One of the most significant purposes of the 1991 Act was to
provide employees who are the victims of discrimination with the
right to pursue their claim for damages in front of a jury. This
right was balanced against the parties' right to choose to arbitrate
their civil rights claims instead of resolving the matter through
litigation. The right to voluntarily choose arbitration should not
be read as a permission slip for employers to require employees to
sign arbitration clauses if employees do not want to give up their
statutory right to a jury trial. Our civil rights statutes would be
significantly undermined if the courts allowed employers to force
employees to choose between their statutorily protected civil rights
and their jobs. Nowhere is the danger of unequal bargaining
power more apparent than in the pre-contract context where the
employer holds all the cards. It is particularly pungent in an
economy where jobs are scarce and employees cannot afford to
turn down employment, even if it means giving up their civil
rights protections afforded by statute.
While the text of the 1991 Act does not preclude waiver of
civil rights protections, it also does not compel waiver at the
insistence of the employer. Because the text of the statute is silent
as to whether an employer may condition employment on waiving
the employee's civil rights protection, it is appropriate to examine
the legislative history of the Act. In so doing, it is abundantly
clear that Congress did not intend to permit employers to force
employees to choose between their civil rights and their jobs. Both
the Second and Ninth Circuits have recognized this clear
legislative intent, but both circuit courts have refused to consider
it in making their decisions.
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The Ninth Circuit's decision in Luce Forward was erroneous
on several levels. The cases relied upon in Luce Forward do not
even address the pre-contract. issue presented in the Ninth
Circuit's case. The court also ignored the difference between pre-
contract disputes and numerous Supreme Court and circuit court
decisions involving post-contract disputes. Finally, the court
ignored a potential reading of the statute that is consistent with
both its text and its legislative history. The only way to read both
the text and the legislative history in a consistent manner is to
permit employees to make a waiver of their statutory civil rights
protections. Absent a voluntary waiver, courts should prohibit
employers from forcing employees to choose between their civil
rights and their jobs.
